Colita Williams and Mae Williams, Dependents of Earl Rae Williams, Deceased v. the Industrial Commission of Utah, Mesa Drillers and Employers Casualty Company : Defendant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1965
Colita Williams and Mae Williams, Dependents of
Earl Rae Williams, Deceased v. the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Mesa Drillers and Employers
Casualty Company : Defendant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Bernard M. Tanner, Lloyd B. Gerber, and Lorin N. Pace;
Attorneys for Respondents
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Williams v. Indus Comm'n of Utah, No. 10273 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3520
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CO!JTA WILLIAMS and M J;~ I L E D 
WILLIAMS, JUN 1 - 1965 
Dependants of EARL RAE WIL..,__ __ 





... , .... THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, MESA DRILLERS and 
EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COM-
PANY 
-IVERSITY OF UTAH 
Defendanrs OCTI 5 1965 
------1t~ LAW LIBRAR'G 
DEFENDANTS' ~IEF 
Bernard M. Tanner 
Lloyd B. Gerber 
Lorin N. Pace, 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Respondent 
19 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Robert E. Froerer 
M. Blaine Peterson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Appellants 
200 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
DISPOSITION SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS ---------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------~----------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
POINT I 
The Commission was not in Error in Rejecting 
the Medical Panel Report ------------------------------------------------ 5 
POINT II 
The Commission was not in Error in Finding that 
there was not a Scintilla of Competent Evidence 
of exposure to Paraformaldehyde -------------------------------- 8 
POINT III 
The Commission was not in Error in Finding that 
there was no Competent Medical Evidence that 
Exposure, if any, Caused or Contributed to the 
Death of Earl Rae Williams -----------------------·-------------------- 11 
POINT IV 
The Commission did not act in a Capricious, 
Arbitrary and Unusual Manner------------------------------------ 13 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-continued 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Higbey v. Industrial Commission 75 Utah 361, 285 
p. 306 -----------·······--··--········--·····--------------------------------------15 
Bingham Mines v. Alsop 59 Utah 306, 203 p. 644 ____________ 15 
Sugar v. Industrial Commision 94 Utah 56, 75 
p. 2nd, 311 ------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Pintar v. Industrial Commission and Geneva 
Steel Div. of U.S. Steel Corp. 14 Utah 2nd 276, 
382 p. 2nd 414 --------··------------··--------------------------------------- 16 
Burton v. Industrial Commission 13 Utah 2nd 353, 
374 p. 2 439 -------------------····---------------·-······----------------····· 16 
Morris v. Industrial Commission 90 Utah 56, 61p.2 
415 ·---····-·-·-·--···--···-------------------------------------·---------------····· 16 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended Title 35-1-77 ---- 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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DISPOSITION SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS 
The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Mesa 
Drillers, and Employers Casualty Company seek that 
the Utah Supreme Court confirm the Order and Findings 
of the Industrial Commission denying Plaintiffs' Claim 
for death benefits (R 153, 154) and further affirming 
the Order denying a rehearing of the Industrial Com-
mission on November 4, 1964 (R 158). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Decedent was employed by Mesa Drillers near Bland-
ing, Utah, on or about July 3, 1957. At this time a com-
mercial mud mix know as Northern Mud was used 
containing a My-lo-jel preservation. My-lo-jel preser-
vative contained paraformaldehyde which when dis-
solved in water released a toxic formaldehyde. (R. 4, 23) 
Formaldehyde, depending on concentration, can cause 
irritations to the mucous membranes and may, when 
exposure is extreme, cause chronic bronchitis and may 
lead to pneumonia. However, for such a condition to 
exist, it would be necessary for an individual to have 
been exposed to such a degree that he would not volun-
tarily stand by and allow the exposure to continue. Or 
in other words, the material is sufficiently irritating, 
that anyone capable of doing so would immediately leave 
the area. The only conditions under which severe effects 
are likely to occur would be if the individual were con-
fined in such a way that he could not escape or if he 
were overcome and could not escape. (R. 144, 145). 
The basic facts of the alleged exposure and accident 
relied on by Plaintiffs were largely related by a Mr. 
Earl B. Clark and by a Mr. LeRoy Ramey. The testimony 
of Earl B. Clark and LeRoy Ramey go into great detail 
concerning the manner in which the deceased was re-
quired to work in closed shed, mixing the Northern Mud 
material, how he was exposed to the dust of the mixture, 
how the dust was irritating to the skin of the deceased, 
how Earl Clark kicked the sides off the shed in order to 
make for better ventilation for the deceased and how 
Earl Clark washed the powder residue of the mix off 
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of the deceased. (R 68, 69, 70, 71, 84, 85, 86, 80, 73). 
The driller on the job, Buster Copeland, provided a 
signed statement in which he indicated that Williams 
had worekd for the Company for approximately three 
weeks. During the last week Williams worked he had the 
ful and was sick. Copeland noticed that he was taikng 
pills every day. On the last day he worked, Copeland 
noticed that he was sick, and on the way in from work he 
vomited. At no time while Williams worked for Mesa 
Drillers did he ever complain of anything on the job 
causing him to get sick. (R 138) 
Copeland, as foreman, first knew of Williams being 
sick in the hospital the day after hospitalization occurred. 
The foreman also saw Williams at his house several days 
afterwards and Williams said nothing about being made 
ill on the job. (R 139). 
The alleged exposure evidently occurred on July 3, 
1957. The parties returned to work on July 4th and 5th, 
and returning home from work on July 5th, Williams 
became ill, (R 138) and was that evening admitted to the 
hospital (R 97). Williams was examined in the hospital 
by Dr. Charles Massion. When Dr. Massion was asked 
about any reference to exposure to a chemical substance, 
he could not remember any reference being made by 
Williams (R 7). 
Decedent was released from the hospital on July 9, 
1957, and begun a journey with his wife to his home 
in Texas. In route at Levelland, Texas, the Decedent died 
and Dr. Barnes, the attending physician attributed death 
to a coronary occlusion (R 35). 
In interpreting the testimony given, the Industrial 
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Commission undoubtedly weighed the testimony given 
by LeRoy Ramey, Earl B. Clark and one of the Plaintiffs , 
Colita Williams. Mr. Ramey testified to many of the 
details of the exposure and accident. The exposure and 
accident exidently all occured on July 3rd 1957 (R 65-83). 
The daily drilling report from Mesa Drilling Company 
for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th days of July bears the 
signatures of the various men who worekd on the job 
and the number of hours worked on the respective days. 
The work record shows that LeRoy Ramey did not work 
on July 3rd when he testified he was there and saw the 
details of the accident. It also shows that the Decedent, 
Mr. Earl Williams, did work on the 4th of July and so did 
Mr. Ramey, and yet there is no testimony adduced as 
to anything that happened on the 4th of July, and the 
parties, in fact, testify that they did not work on the 4th 
of July. The work record shows that they worked eight 
hours (R 140, 141) and Defendant's exhibit 1). 
Mr. Clark testified that he was a former husband of 
Mrs. Colita Williams (R 89). 
Based on the record accumulated by the Industrial 
Commission, on the Medical Panel's report, the hearing 
on the Medical Panel's Report, and a rehearing, the Com· 
mission entered its order on September 23, 1964. 
The Defendants allege that the evidence adduced in 
the trial is sufficient to sustain the findings of the In· 
dustrial Commission, that the Industrial Commission did 
not act arbitrarily and capriciously, and did not exceed 
any of its powers. The Defendants further allege that the 
findings of the Medical Panel were based upon supposition 
and upon questionable testimony of LeRoy Ramey who 
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according to the work record was not even present, Earl 
Clark, former husband of the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff 
herself, whose only contact with the accident was what 
the deceased allegedly told her about what accurred. 
It is interesting to note that those things the deceased 
allegedly told his wife about the occurrence of the 
accident were never repeated by the deceased to the 
doctors who attended him. 
In the Plaintiffs argument it is pointed out that certain 
findings and conclusions could have been drawn by the 
Commission. The Defendants admit that it would have 
been possible to arrive at the conclusions and findings 
as set forth by the Plaintiffs if the Commission were to 
accept all of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in the 
case, and if the Commission were to ignore all of the 
evidence by the Defendants. The Commission is entitled 
to base its conclusions on acceptable evidence from dis-
interested parties, and in so doing, is in no way being 
arbitrary or capricious. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT IN ERROR IN 
REJECTING THE MEDICAL PANEL'S REPORT. 
On March 25, 1960, the Industrial Commission wrote 
to M. Blaine Peterson, offering to submit the matter to 
a Medical Panel, if the parties could stipulate on the 
facts (R 14). No stipulation was actually made on the 
facts, and together with other documents submitted to 
the medical panel, was an unsigned statement made by 
the Plaintiff, Calita Williams, wife of the deceased. The 
unsigned statement is extraordinarily detailed and de-
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scriptive, particularly from one who does not purport 
to have been anywhere near the ecene where the accident 
or exposure took place. Among other things, the state-
ment stated: "He was overcome by the poisonous fumes 
almost to the extent of unconsciousness. He was removed 
from the small building by the other workers at the 
location. The following day was a holiday, the 4th of 
July. Mr. Williams was at home all day and was ill. He 
complained of chest pains and difficulty in breathing, 
and he stated that it was this powder and the poisonous 
fumes therefrom that was causing the trouble. On July 
5th he reported to the location but could not work due 
to the chest pains and difficulty in breathing. That after-
noon he went to the hospital at Cortez. This was Friday 
that he was admitted to the hospital and he stayed until 
Tuesday, July 9th. He was attended by Dr. Massion. He 
left the hospital at Cortez on July 9th. He was not able 
to return to work and still complained of pains in his 
chest and difficulty in breathing." (R 15) 
It would have been entirely proper for the medical 
panel to give an apinon such as was given based on the 
purported facts. But even the medical panel in its report 
in the second paragraph states: 
"It is to be noted that the only description of the 
alleged injury is contained in your file in an unsigned 
statement, presumably obtained by from the widow 
by an attorney representing her. This was undated. 
There was a briefer statement of alleged injury in 
the application for hearing signed by the widow 
about a year and a half after the alleged accident" 
(R 37) 
In the last paragraph of the same report, the Medical 
Panel states, 
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"It is to be emphasized that the opinion of the panel 
is largely based upon and acceptance of the unsigned 
statement that there was an exposure to parafonn-
aldehyde and that such exposure was in sufficient 
degree to result in pneumonitis." (R 39). 
Title 35-1-77 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Ameneded, 
states ..... . 
"And the Commission may base its findings and de-
cisions on the report of the Panel but shall not be 
bound by such report if there is other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a 
contrary finding by the Commission .... " 
In this case it is true that Earl Clark and LeRoy Ramey 
testified to substantially the same material as was origi-
nally testified to the Plaintiff Mrs. Colita Williams, and 
upon which the Medical Panel based its report. However, 
a serious cloud is thrown over the testimony of Mrs. 
Williams in that it was impossible for her to be present 
at the time of the exposure, and the work record shows 
that LeRoy Ramey was not on the job at all on the day 
of the exposure, and that Earl Clark is a former husband 
of Mrs. Williams. It is submitted that is is within the 
discretion of the commission to select that evidence 
which is the most credible and to use that evidence in 
arriving at its decision. It is further noteworthy that the 
medical panel itself based its decision on three pro-
babilities and selected what was in the opinion, in the 
light of the evidence submitted (being the unsigned 
statement of Mrs. Williams) that one of these probabilities 
was the most likely. 
The Medical report of the panel could only be sustained 
if the Commission found that the facts as related by the 
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Plaintiff Mrs. Williams were substantially correct. The 
manner and form of such evidence did not warrant such 
credibility. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT IN ERROR IN FIND-
ING THAT THERE WAS NOT A SCINTILLA OF COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE OF EXPOSURE TO PARAFORM-
ALDEHYDE. 
The question is not whether there was an exposure to 
paraformaldehyde, but whether there was a sufficient 
exposure to paraformaldehyde for a sufficient length of 
time and in sufficient quantities to cause a chemically 
induced pneumonia which could lead to the deceased's 
death. Again, the entire basis of the testimony submitted 
by the Plaintiffs and in behalf of the Plaintiffs was by 
witnesses who are seriously subject to question in their 
credibility as has been formerly set forth. It is interesting 
to note that Dr. Massion of Cortez, who treated the patient 
for a period of one week, was never advised by the patient 
that he considered his illness a result of a chemical ex-
posure. Neither did the doctors seen in Clovis, New 
Mexico, or in Levelland, Texas, receive any such in-
dication from the deceased. (R 7, 8, 9, 13, 126) 
A letter to the Medical Panel from Dr. E. D. Barnes 
stated that he saw Mr. Williams on July 14th, 1957, when 
he gave a history of having had a sereve pain toward the 
anterior part of the chest, radiating down the left arm 
on July 4th, 1957 ... (R 126). No statement was made by 
the deceased to Dr. Barnes of a chemical exposure. 
Dr. Alan K. Done, upon being questioned concerning 
paraformaldehyde, stated: 
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". . this of course would depend upon the concent-
ration. But it is intensely irritating, and would ir-
ritate all mucous membrances-including those of 
the respiratory tract, the throat, the eyes, the nose--
and would be extremely uncomforable. And acutely 
so. Above and beyond this, it can leave residual 
damage--in terms of damage to the tracheal bron-
chial tree, chronic bronchitis. It can lead to pneu-
monia, but usually does this only under circum-
stances where the exposure is truly overwhelming, 
or is chronic and repeated. (R 144) 
Q - As a matter of a hypothetical question, Doctor, 
from your experience-and from what research 
you may have done-do you have an opinoion 
as to whether or not a person would be capable 
of remaining in a condition of exposure to form-
aldehyde gas a sufficient duration, and remain 
conscious, to receive acute effects as you have 
just indicated? (R 144) 
A - Yes. To receive sufficient exposure to have re-
sulted in say pneumonia, I think it would have 
been necessary for the individual to have been 
exposed to such a degree that he would not 
voluntarily stand by and allow it to continue. 
In other words this material is sufficiently 
irritating that anyone who was capable of doing 
so would, I'm sure, immediately leave the area. 
It is extremely irritating. So that hypothetically 
the only conditions under which this is likely to 
occur would be if the individual were confined 
in such a way that he could not escape, or he 
were overcome. (R 144, 145) 
Q - .. Wouldn't his reaction to the gas itself be of 
such a violent nature that he could not endure 
it for long enough time to receive damage there-
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from? 
A - From a single acute exposure, yes. Damage can 
occur from lower exposure over a longer period 
of time, and intermittent. 
Q - Now as a result of your research on this, did 
did you check medical records back over a 
period of time to determine if there had been 
any previous occurences of pneumonitis chemi-
cally induced by this particular chemical? 
A - I reviewed the medical and industrial health 
literature going back 40 years, as well as is 
possible to do so with the indices that are avail-
able at the present time, and found no similar 
case reported in the medical literature. 
Q - Ref erring back to your previous answers before 
that one, would a single exposure-as a hypothe-
tical, or directly related to this case- would an 
exposure of say an hour to an hour and a half or 
possibly two hours' duration be as a single in-
stance, in your opinion, be sufficient to induce 
chemically a pneumonitis? 
A - It could be. It would depend entirely upon the 
concentration of formaldehyde in the atmos-
phere. 
Q - With such a concentration, would the individual 
not be driven from the area before that occurred 
but for the fact that say he was unconscious, or 
was such that he could not escape the enclosure? 
A - Such a concentration, in my opinion, would be 
intolerable. (R 146, 147) 
The Defendants respectfully submit that even if the 
testimony taken from Clark and Ramey is given full 
credibility, it does not show exposure to paraformalde· 
hyde in a harmful concentration for a period of one and 
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one-half hours. Dr. Done's testimony was to the effect 
that such exposure would be so irritating that the 
recipient could not stand such an exposure and would 
not permit it unless he were unconscious. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT IN ERROR IN FIND-
ING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPETENT MEDICAL 
EVIDECE THAT EXPOSURE, IF ANY, CAUSED OR 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEATH OF EARL RAE 
WILLIAMS. 
Dr. Massion of Cortez, Colorado, who attended the 
deceased in the hospital and thereafter, stated: "I do 
not remember if at the time he made any statement with 
regard to having inhaled any material while at work. I 
did not enter any comments he may have made at this 
time in the hospital record." (R 7). It is interesting to note 
that one of the important factors a in treating a patient 
is in obtaining as full and complete medical history as is 
possible and particularly the causes or apparent causes 
of the illness being treated. It is logical to assume that 
since the history of this illness was not noted as being 
due to a chemical exposure, that is was felt to be due to 
a bacterial infection by the doctor and by Mr. Williams 
himself. 
Dr. Massion proceeds: "I have been requested by Mrs. 
Williams and one of her attorneys to state an opinion with 
regard as to whether her husband's death was caused 
by poisonous fumes or substances. I am unable to state 
such an opinion since I have had no experience prior to 
this with industrial poisons. It would be obvious to me 
12 
that Mr. Williams underwent the usual course in evo. 
lution of a bacterial lung infection. In view of the fact 
that his fever rose to 104 degree, there must have been 
such an infection present. I am unable to deny or confirm 
that an inhaled toxin or poison would have aggravated or 
perhaps initiated this process. I, however, failed to see ' 
any connection between possible poisoning and eventual 
cause of death." (R 9). 
Contrary to opinion of counsel for the Plaintiffs, it 
would appear that this statement of Dr. Massion indicates 
that he had no knowledge whatsoever of industrial 
chemical poisoning and that it was his opinion that even 
had there been some chemical poisoning, that this was 
a bacterial pneumonia condition. 
The only other doctor to treat the deceased was Dr. ' 
E. D. Barnes of Levelland, Texas, who advised .... "he 
gave a history of having had severe pain over the 
anterior part of the chest radiating down the left arm on 
July 4th, 1957." (R 35). This is completely contrary to 
anything reported by the Plaintiffs. Dr. Barnes stated 
fuat the medical history that he had obtained was typical 
of a coronary occulsion and this was his reason for at· 
tributing Mr. Williams' death to that cause. (R 35) 
The Medical Panel's report stated that "it is a legal, 
rather than a medical, matter to determine whether the ' 
statements contained are admissable evidence. The Panel 
must proceed with a medical opinion based upon the 
assumption that these statements are acceptable in evi· 
dence. The Panel further reports, "the data is so sketchy 
for this interval between his seeing Dr. Massion on July 
9th and his death on July 14th, that it is not possible for 
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the panel to express a positive opinion as to the final 
cause of death. There are three possibilities: 
(1) These had an acute exacerbation of an in-
completely resolved pulmonary process, per-
haps aggravated or incited by the fatigue of the 
long automobile trip. 
(2) That he had myocardial infarction based upon 
coronary thrombosis and that this was in-
dependent of the preceding pulmonary illness. 
(3) That he had a myocardial infarction which was 
precipitated or aggravated by the preceding 
pulmonary illness. 
It appears to the Panel that of these three possibilities, 
the first is more probable-namely that his death was 
a result of an aggravation- of the previous pulmonary 
condition." (R 39) 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT IN A CAPRICIOUS, 
ARBITRARY AND UNUSUAL MANNER. 
The Plaintiffs, in attacking the Industrial Commission, 
for being negative and for having expressed that the 
medical evidence pending in the case is negative, failed 
to recognize that as of the date of those letters, February 
24th, 1960, and March 25th, 1960, there was no evidence 
whatsoever in the file of the commission except the 
medical report from Cortez, Colorado, and a death 
certificate. 
Plaintiffs allege that the rehearing held August 12, 
1964, did not produce any new experts, nor any new 
evidence. The record shows the introduction of evidence 
from Dr. Alan K. Done, who although he was consulted 
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by the medical panel, did not previously testify, and who 
provided substantial new evidence and convincing eyj. 
dence concerning the toxic effects of paraformaldehyde 
as set forth in Point II herein. 
It was the intention of the Defendants to bring to the 
hearing a Dr. J. F. Osterritter, Medical Director of the 
Celanese Corporation of America, manufacturers of para- 1 
formaldehyde. A letter from Dr. Osterritter is included 
in the file (R 114) in which Dr. Osterritter states: 
" .... the inhalation of formaldehyde vapor causes smart-
ing of the eyes, nose and throat and is irritating so that 
a person exposed will not long tolerate it and will leave 
the area. If a person is capoble of remaining in an area 
where there is formaldehyde vapor present, then the 
concentration is not likely to be high enough to cause any 
acute effects ... The only time a chemical pneumonitis or 
pneumonia is likely to occur is when an individual comes 
into contact with a very high concentration of for· 
moldehyde; then there would be much coughing, choking 
and watering of the eyes. Unless the working conditions 
in the case in question were sudh that very high con· 
centrations of formaldehyde were produced, the case ' 
that you described should not develop pneumonia or a 
heart condition." (R 114). 
The conclusions of Dr. J. F. Osterritter, M. D. were 
much the same of those of Dr. Alan K. Done, adduced 
in the rehearing and as quoted in Point II of this Brief. 
In addition, there was introduced into evidence the 
work an drilling record of the area which unequivoc· 
ably demonstrated that the deceased and his crew had 
worked on July 4th 1957. It further established this, not· 
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withstanding the fact that the three witness who testified 
for the Plaintiff, Earl Clark LeRoy Ramey and Colita 
Williams testified that the crew did not work on July 
4th. The record further demonstrated that on July 3rd, 
1957, when the alleged exposure took place, LeRoy Ramey 
did not report to work, and could not have been present 
at the time of the exposure. 
The Commission did not base its decision on hear say 
evidence, because the employer's record is not heresay, 
nor is the testimony of Dr. Alan R. K. Done or of the 
medical panel. The Plaintiff in stating that the Com-
mission must base its decision on some type of reasonably 
substantial proof ignores the fact that it is the Plaintiff 
who must establish her case by a reasonably substantial 
proof, as the burden of proof is upon the Applicant to 
establish her claim for compensation. Higbey vs. in-
dustrial Commission, 75 Utah 361, 285 Pacific 306; 
Bingham Mines vs. Alsop 59 Utah 306 203 Pacific 644. 
Where the Industrial Commission is driven to surmise 
or conjecture, the injured person or his dependents can-
not recover compensation benefits. The factfinder is not 
bound to adopt the theory of the applicant, even if there 
is some evidence to support it. Sugar vs. Industrial Com-
mission 94 Utah 56, 75 Pacific 2nd 311. 
Surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is not suf-
ficient to justify a finding in behalf of the applicant. 
Higbey vs. Industrial Commission 75 Utah 361 285 Pacific 
306. 
If there were no other testimony than that submitted 
by the Plaintiffs, and if there were no reasonable alter-
natives, to the conclusions arrived at by' the Plaintiffs, 
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and if the medical testimony were not speculative on the 
occurrence of certain facts and certain conditions, it is 1 
conceivable that the industrial Commission could have 
held for the Plaintiffs. 
In Pintar vs. Industrial Commission of Utah and 
Geneva Steel Division of U.S. Steel Corporation, 14 
Utah 2nd 276, 382 Pacific 2nd 414, the Court states on 
p. 415, "the difficulty with Plaintiff's position is that 
there is other evidence which supports the view adopted 
by the Commission, whose perogative it is to determine 
the facts." 
In Burton vs. Industrial Commission 13 Utah 2nd, 353 
27 4 Pacific 2nd, 439 this Court said on page 554, "In order 
to reverse the findings and order made, the Plaintiff must 
show that there is such credible, uncontradicted evidence 
in her favor that the Commission's refusal to so find was 
capricious and arbitrary. See also Morris vs. Industrial 
Commission 90 Utah 56, 61 Pacific 2nd 415. "The Com· 
mission could reasonable disbelieve the Plaintiff's story 
that his physical problems where the result of the in· 
cident described by him." 
CONCLUSION - We respectfully submit that the pro· 
ceeding of the Industrial Commission were properly con· 
ducted and that the Commisison reached the proper 
conclusion and result from the evidence there presented. 
The decision and order of the Commission should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON, DUFFIN & PACE 
Lorin N. Pace 
19 W. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
